Iraq 2026

Iraq in 2026 is pulled along three overlapping fault lines: a persistent ISIS insurgency in the north, entrenched Iranian-backed militias operating inside the machinery of the state, and cross-border Turkish military operations against Kurdish PKK fighters. ACLED continues to record regular ISIS attacks in northern Iraq more than eight years after the territorial defeat of the "caliphate," while the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) — nominally part of Iraq's security apparatus but functionally tied to Tehran — control significant levers of state power. A residual US troop presence and Iraq's role as a major oil exporter keep the country exposed to any wider escalation between Washington and Iran.

Background

Iraq's post-ISIS order was built on the 2017 territorial defeat of the group's self-declared "caliphate," a campaign that left the country's security architecture permanently reshaped. The Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Sha'abi), a coalition of dozens of mostly Shia armed factions mobilized in 2014 to help fight ISIS, were formally folded into Iraq's security forces but never fully subordinated to the central government. Many of the most powerful PMF factions maintain direct ties to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, giving Tehran durable leverage over Iraqi politics, security policy and border trade long after the anti-ISIS campaign ended.

In the north, Turkey has for decades conducted periodic airstrikes and ground incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan targeting the PKK, which uses the mountainous terrain along the border as a rear base. That campaign has continued largely independent of Baghdad's control, straining relations between the federal government, the Kurdistan Regional Government, and Ankara.

Much of this fragmentation traces back to the 2003 US-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein and dismantled Iraq's central state institutions, creating a security vacuum that sectarian militias, and later ISIS, moved to fill. Iraq's heavy dependence on oil revenue to fund the state — the sector accounts for the overwhelming majority of government income — has made control over export infrastructure in the south and border crossings elsewhere a central prize in the competition between the federal government, the PMF, and Kurdish authorities.

Current Situation (2026)

ACLED continues to track a steady rhythm of ISIS remnant activity concentrated in the Nineveh–Kirkuk–Diyala corridor: ambushes on checkpoints, roadside IEDs, and targeted killings of local officials and tribal figures who cooperate with security forces. The group no longer holds territory, but its cells have proven durable in rural and desert areas that Iraqi and Kurdish forces struggle to patrol continuously.

The PMF, meanwhile, remains the dominant power broker in large parts of the country. Individual factions control lucrative border crossings with Iran and Syria, influence government contracting, and in some areas operate with more practical authority than the Iraqi army or police. This dual-track security structure — a formal state military alongside Iran-aligned militias answering to competing political patrons — continues to complicate any US or Iraqi effort to present a unified security policy.

In the north, Turkish forces continue to strike PKK positions inside Iraqi Kurdistan, a campaign now running for years without a political resolution in sight. Baghdad, caught between a reduced but still-present US military footprint aimed at preventing an ISIS resurgence and Iranian-aligned militias operating with near impunity, remains structurally exposed to any escalation in the broader US-Iran confrontation playing out elsewhere in the region.

CFR's Global Conflict Tracker continues to list Iraq as a Tier II concern, reflecting a country that is formally at peace but structurally unstable: corruption tied to militia control of state contracts remains endemic, government formation after national elections has repeatedly been slowed by factional bargaining among PMF-linked political blocs, and the reduced US troop presence means Baghdad increasingly has to manage the ISIS remnant threat with its own, often under-resourced, security forces.

Regional Hotspots

• North Iraq / ISIS territory CRITICAL
• Kirkuk region HIGH
• Baghdad (militias) MEDIUM
• Basra / south Iran border LOW

Key Actors

Islamic State Remnants (ISIS)

A rural, decentralized insurgency rather than a territorial force, ISIS cells remain active in northern Iraq, where ACLED records regular attacks on security personnel, local officials and infrastructure more than eight years after the group's battlefield defeat.

Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) & Iran-Aligned Factions

A coalition of dozens of mostly Shia militia factions formally under the Iraqi prime minister's command but, in practice, often answering to competing leaders aligned with Tehran. Controls significant levers of state power, border trade and reconstruction contracting.

Turkey & the PKK

Turkey conducts recurring airstrikes and ground operations against PKK positions inside the Kurdistan Region, a long-running cross-border campaign that periodically strains relations with both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)

Governs Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdish region and must balance its own security relationship with Ankara against periodic friction with Baghdad over budget transfers, disputed territories such as Kirkuk, and oil export revenue — all while hosting Turkish military operations against the PKK on its own soil.

Humanitarian Impact

Years of ISIS occupation and the subsequent campaign to dislodge it left a lasting humanitarian legacy: millions of Iraqis were displaced during the 2014–2017 war against the group, and many families from Nineveh and surrounding provinces still have not been able to safely return home. Ongoing ISIS remnant attacks continue to threaten civilians and local officials in the north, while communities in areas under PMF influence report limited recourse against militia overreach and extortion at checkpoints and border crossings. Turkish cross-border operations have periodically displaced civilians in the Kurdistan Region's border districts, and Iraq's near-total fiscal dependence on oil exports leaves ordinary Iraqis exposed to the country's chronic governance and service-delivery failures whenever prices or output are disrupted.

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